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Abstract
We consider the issue of reporting the result of search experiment in the most
unbiased and efficient way, i.e. in a way which allows an easy interpretation and
combination of results and which do not depend on whether the experimenters
believe or not to having found the searched-for effect. Since this work uses the
language of Bayesian theory, to which most physicists are not used, we find that
it could be useful to practitioners to have in a single paper a simple presentation
of Bayesian inference, together with an example of application of it in search of
rare processes.
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1 Introduction
An often debated issue1) in frontier science research is how to report results ob-
tained from search experiments at the limit of the detector sensitivity. Sometimes re-
searchers have simply to state a clear null result, i.e. when all members of the experimen-
tal team agree that no new phenomenon is indicated by the data. At other times they
may have some hints that the data could indicate the presence of the searched-for signal,
as a result of a more or less pronounced excess of events above the expected background
level. In lucky, and rare, cases new phenomena are seen in such a spectacular way that all
researchers agree and everybody is convinced. Clearly, reporting the result may become
problematic in the second case. “The experiment was inconclusive, and we had to use
statistics”, somebody once said.
The purpose of this paper is to show how results of the search for rare phenomena
can be presented, in order to best use the information contained in the experimental
data, i.e. in the most powerful and unbiased way. Since the three situations sketched out
above are, in reality, never so sharply separated, the presentation of the result should
not depend on whether researchers feel that their case is a negative, doubtful, or positive
one. Moreover, it is important that the pieces of evidence from different experiments can
be combined in the most efficient way. If, for example, many independent data sets each
provide a little evidence in favour of the searched-for signal, the combination of all data
should enhance that hypothesis. If, instead, the indications provided by the different data
sets are incoherent, their combination should provide a stronger constraint on the intensity
of the postulated process.
Typical fields of research in which the above described problematic situation arises
are, to give a few examples, neutrino oscillations, rare decays, new particles, gravitational
waves, and dark matter. All these processes have in common the fact that, under station-
arity of the search conditions, the physical process can be modelled with high accuracy by
a Poisson process, and the physical quantity (a mass, a cross-section, a branching ratio,
a rate, etc.) of interest will be related to the intensity r of that process.
Although the methods described in this paper are of general use, we think that they
can be better understood by way of a case study. We consider the problem of inferring the
rate of bursts of gravitational waves (g.w.) on Earth. This case presents typical features
common to other frontier searches, but the problem remains unidimensional, since only
one quantity is inferred,2) and thus easy to describe. The extension to higher dimensions
1) The many recent papers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] on ‘limits’, not to mention
notes internal to experimental teams, give an idea of the present interest in the subject. However,
this article is not a review of the various ‘prescriptions’ suggested by the many authors involved in
the discussion. In fact, the point of view presented in this paper is that the search of the Holy Grail
containing the unique and objective prescription to calculate limits is a false problem. Since the cited
papers — with the exception of Ref. [8] and, to some extent, Ref. [17] — are written in this spirit, they
are irrelevant for this work. Another common point of all the cited authors, with the sole exception of
Ref. [8], is to consider the frequentist concept of coverage as good guidance. Zech [8] considers coverage
“a magic objective of classical confidence bounds. It has an attractive property from a purely aesthetic
point of view but it is not obvious how to make use of this concept”. Our opinion about frequentistic
coverage is even more severe, and it has been discussed extensively in Ref. [20]. Moreover, comments
on Refs. [3] and [4], which have triggered most of the cited papers, can be found in Refs. [18] and [19].
In particular, one should not overlook the fact that the results obtained by frequentistic confidence
intervals, as well as those obtained by frequentistic hypothesis tests, are usually misunderstood and
might even induce researchers to draw misleading scientific conclusions [18, 20].
2) For example, in neutrino oscillation search the results are given in terms of the mixing angle and of
the mass-squared difference. Note that, also in this case, it would be very interesting to have the result
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is, at least conceptually, straightforward.
Since the methods used in the paper are based on Bayesian inference and subjective
probability, to which most researchers are at present not accustomed, we feel that it is
necessary to introduce this matter in an extensive and elementary way. In particular, we
also think it is important to clarify some of the philosophical aspects which physicists tend
to ignore, but which are crucial to the understanding and acceptance of the inferential
framework which will be used. Therefore, we consider it is convenient for the reader to
have a description of the case study and of the inferential framework in an almost self-
contained article.3)
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section we recall the
present status and future prospects of g.w. burst search, stressing some of the important
aspects of the experiments which affect our general considerations about the analysis
strategy. Then, the inferential framework to be used to report results will be presented
and discussed in depth, though remaining at an introductory level. In the core of the
paper the inferential model will be applied to the case study, with general considerations
and numerical examples. Finally some conclusions will be drawn.
2 Gravitational-wave burst search
2.1 Status and perspective
The interest in g.w.’s is related to the astrophysical information they contain and
also to the implications their detection would have for fundamental physics [22]. Their
detection would, in fact, lead to confirmation of Einstein’s general relativity predictions in
a more direct way than Hulse and Taylor’s observations [23]. Gravitational-wave detectors
could provide a direct measure of the waves and could also test their properties. In par-
ticular, using a network of detectors, wave speed and polarization state can be inferred.
Regarding the emission process, the importance of g.w.’s lies in the fact that they pass
through matter without being significantly absorbed or scattered, unlike electromagnetic
waves and even weakly interacting neutrinos. Thus the information about the emission
process carried by g.w.’s is really unique (see Ref. [24] for a review of g.w. sources).
At present, one of the most interesting activities within that section of the com-
munity which is operating resonant antennae is the search for evidence of g.w. bursts.
These are defined as bunches of g.w.’s whose time width is smaller than the time constant
of the detectors (the latter being typically of the order of milliseconds). Thus their energy
spread is expected to be flat across the whole of the frequency bandwidth of the detector.
A burst of g.w.’s can be produced in a gravitational collapse associated with supernova
explosions, or during the final stage of the coalescence of binary systems (neutron stars,
black holes), or in processes involving massive black holes, such as the capture of a near
body.
Astrophysical estimates of rates and signal amplitudes for these processes on Earth
would seem discouraging in the light of the present theoretical ideas. In fact, given the
sensitivity of the present antennae, the expected rates are much too low to give a sizable
excess of candidate events above the expected background. The available detectors could,
in fact, detect a g.w. burst from the Galaxy if a process radiated 1% of a solar mass
in terms of cross-section of the process searched for, kept separate from the interpretation in terms of
the postulated oscillations. Then, one would deal also in this case with unidimensional problems, i.e.
cross-sections for bins of the incoming neutrino energy.
3) Brief and extensive physicist’s introductions to subjective probability and Bayesian inference can be
found in Refs. [20] and [21], respectively.
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(M⊙), which would yield a dimensionless wave amplitude on Earth of 10
−18 [25, 26].
However, the expected supernova rate in the Galaxy could be in the range of one per 10-
100 years (see e.g. Ref. [27]) and an emission of 1%M⊙ into g.w.’s seems quite improbable.
Nevertheless, there is no solid ground for supposing that this hypothesized fraction of
energy is released into g.w.’s and even larger fractions are conceivable [22]. Moreover,
the burst rate could increase by a factor of about 1000 if the antennae were sensitive
to astronomical events within a distance of 10 Mpc, thus including the Virgo cluster.
Improved bar detectors [28, 29], as well as planned interferometers [30], are expected to
reach this level of sensitivity.
In conclusion, although current prospects are not encouraging, the many uncer-
tainties on the physics processes involved might still mean that surprises are in store
and for this reason it is important to be prepared to exploit to the full the information
provided by operating and planned detectors.
2.2 Search strategy
Gravitational-wave bursts are very weak signals, embedded in the noise of the
detector. Thus, they can be extracted from the detector data by proper filtering, optimized
to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for this class of events [31]. The analysis is very
difficult because of the low SNR, the rarity of the events, the uncertainty regarding their
shape, and the non-stationary noise of the detectors [32]. In fact, although some of the
sources of noise, like narrow-band Brownian noise and electronic wide-band noise, are well
understood and their expectations can be modelled with reasonable accuracy, there are
other sources of background which are not easy to handle, and not even easy to recognize.
A filter for g.w. burst search is optimized to increase the SNR for δ-like signals, and
a candidate event is defined when the filtered signal exceeds a certain energy threshold.
The candidate event is characterized by energy, arrival time, above-threshold duration,
and other relevant quantities related to the spectral content in different bandwidths [32].
All event characteristics are, in fact, important. For example, the shape of the electric
signal coming from the transductor can be used to discriminate g.w. bursts from back-
ground.
The rarity of the events looked for and the presence of irreducible background make
it impossible to do this search using a single detector, even if seismic, electromagnetic and
other sensors are often used to veto the data of a g.w. detector (see e.g. Refs. [33, 28]).
Therefore, a coincidence among at least two parallel and distant detectors is required.4)
Gravitational-wave bursts are, in fact, supposed to irradiate the Earth uniformly so that
detectors spread out across the Earth’s surface should be able to detect g.w.’s related to
the same physical event. Hence the whole analysis procedure consists of data filtering,
event selection, vetoes when necessary, and the final coincidence analysis.
An important parameter of the procedure for extracting g.w. burst candidates
is the coincidence window, that is the time width within which the coincidences are
considered. The window can be fixed by considering the physics of the process and the
characteristics of the apparatus [34].
At present five resonant g.w. antennae are in operation, and this is really the first
time that it is possible to search for g.w.’s with such a high number of detectors working
simultaneously: Explorer [33], NAUTILUS [28] and AURIGA [29] in Italy; Allegro [35] in
4) ‘Parallel’ means oriented in such a way as to be sensitive to the same polarization and direction of the
incoming wave, and ‘far’ means located at a distance such that the long-range correlated background
is considered to be negligible.
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USA; Niobe [36] in Australia. A collaboration has been established between the experi-
mental groups, with the aim of performing coincidence searches of g.w. bursts. The joint
effort resulted in 1997 in a data exchange protocol, in which candidate events are precisely
defined and the procedure for exchanging data was agreed (see e.g. Ref. [37] and related
web sites). It is, then, important to agree on an optimal way for publishing results such
that all information contained in the data can be used in the most efficient way.
Coincidence experiment procedures are essentially the same as those used since
the beginning of g.w. experiments [38]. Recently they have been used for the analysis of
Explorer and Allegro 1991 data [26] and analyses of Explorer-NAUTILUS (1994-1996)
and Explorer-Niobe (1995) [39]. The only relevant background to coincidence analysis is
due to accidental coincidences, which can be estimated with high accuracy by off-timing
techniques.
For the sake of simplicity we consider here only coincidences between a couple of
parallel detectors. The rate of background (rb) due to the accidental coincidences between
the candidate events is usually evaluated by the average of the coincidences at shifted
times. Alternatively, one can make use of individual background rates (ri1 and ri2) and
of the coincidence window w to evaluate rb as rb = ri1ri2w. The two estimations of
the expected accidental coincidence rate usually give the same result [34]. Once rb is
evaluated, the observed number of coincidences in a given observation time T due to
background is described by a Poisson distribution. This is because accidental coincidences
fulfil the conditions which define a Poisson process, if the noise is stationary during T .
Therefore, the observed frequency distribution of off-timing coincidences is expected to
be very close to the Poisson probability distribution of parameter λb = rb T . As the
distributions actually observed are indeed of that kind, researchers are highly confident
about the probability distribution of background coincidences.
3 Probability of accidental coincidences versus probability of burst rates
Let us begin by illustrating the kind of problems that can arise in interpreting
results of coincidence experiments, if not properly stated. Let us imagine that nc coinci-
dence events have been observed during the effective observation time T . The probability
of observing nc events, given a Poisson process of intensity rb, is
P (nc | rb) = e
−rb T (rb T )
nc
nc!
. (1)
Two remarks are now in order. First, one should be very careful about calling P (nc | rb)
the ‘probability of the observed number of coincidences’, because what has been observed
is sure and no longer belongs to the domain of the uncertain, to which probability applies
(the certain event has probability 1). P (nc | rb) is, instead, the probability of observing the
hypothetical number of coincidences nc, under the condition that the stochastic process
is described by a Poisson of constant and precisely known intensity rb during the obser-
vation time T . Second, P (nc | rb) does not provide, by itself, a result concerning what the
researchers are interested in, i.e. the rate of g.w. bursts. In fact, P (nc | rb) is a probabilistic
statement about the possible outcome nc, and not about the uncertain rate of g.w. bursts.
However, it is rather intuitive that, if the observed number of coincidences is of the order of
the expected value of the background, i.e. nc ≈ rb T±
√
rb T , the background is considered
to describe the outcome of the experiment well, while if (nc− rb T )/
√
rb T ≫ 1, suspicion
is raised that some of the observed coincidences could be attributed to g.w. bursts (or,
more precisely, to any other physical effect not considered as background). In this paper
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we consider that the only hypothesized but known background is a contribution of g.w.
bursts. As a consequence, there will be g.w. burst rates in which we believe more, others
in which we believe less, and others that we rule out. In other words, we are faced with
an inferential problem, which must treated with care to avoid reporting the result in a
way which might be misleading (see e.g. examples given in Ref. [18]).
To give a numerical example, let us take the case of λb = rb · T = 100, and let
us assume that 130 coincidences have been observed. The probability of nc = 130, given
λb = 100, is 6 ·10−4, but one should not say that ‘there is a probability of 6×10−4 that the
data come from the background’. In fact this would imply that, ‘with 99.94% probability,
the data do not come from background’, i.e. ‘they have to be attributed almost certainly
to a genuine signal’. Indeed, the observation of a low-probability event does not imply
that the hypothesis considered to be the cause of it (the so-called ‘null hypothesis’ H◦, in
our case H◦ = ‘background is the only source of candidate events’) has to be ruled out.
One can recognize, behind the logic of standard hypothesis tests with which we
are all familiar, a revised version of the classical proof by contradiction. In standard
dialectics, one assumes a hypothesis to be true, then looks for a logical consequence which
is manifestly false, in order to reject the hypothesis. The ‘slight’ difference introduced in
the ‘classical’ statistical tests is that the false consequence is replaced by an improbable
one. The argument might seem convincing at first sight, but it has no logical grounds. In
fact, no matter how small the probability is, whatever is observed is not in contradiction
with the null hypothesis, unless it is really impossible. This becomes self-evident when
the probability of whatever can be observed is so small that this kind of reasoning would
rule out H◦ whatever one observes. For example, in our numerical example even P (nc =
100 | λb = 100) = 4% is below the standard probability level under which an event
is declared ‘improbable’. This is the reason why statisticians have invented ‘p-values’,
i.e. ‘probability of the tail(s)’ (see e.g. Ref. [40]). For example, one would say, in our
case, that the reason why the data are against the null hypothesis is not simply because
P (nc = 130 | λb = 100) = 6 · 10−4, but because P (nc ≥ 130 | λb = 100) = 0.23%. But this
does not solve the problem, it makes it worse because one is considering the conditional
probability of not only what has actually been observed, but also what has not been
observed (see e.g. Refs. [20, 41]).
Although we cannot presume to have been fully convincing with these very brief
critical remarks and therefore refer the reader to more general discussions on the subject
(see e.g. Ref. [20] and references therein), the message is that one is not allowed to evaluate
the probability of an effect (or, even worse, the probability of an effect plus that of all
rarer effects not actually observed), given a certain cause, and then to consider it as if it
were the probability of the cause itself.
Some readers might wonder why this paper is making such a big deal about the
criticism expressed above, which after all seems to be founded on intuition, logic and good
sense. The reason is that the standard education of physicists on the subject of probabil-
ity is based on a very peculiar and unnatural point of view (frequentism) which prevents
probability of causes, i.e. what Poincare´ calls ‘the essential problem of the experimental
method’ [42], being talked about. However, despite their education, physicists constantly
make use of this concept, most of the time correctly, as happens in simple routine ap-
plications. But sometimes the combination of good intuition and unsuitable statistical
approach yields wrong conclusions, as reported, e.g., in Ref. [18]. Given this situation, we
think that there is a strong probability that what we are going to say about the way of
reporting results will be misunderstood, if it is not clear what is meant by probability of
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causes (or of hypotheses, or of true values) and how this can be evaluated on the basis of
all available knowledge. Therefore, for the convenience of the reader, in the next section
we give a short introduction to the problem of inference, extracted from Ref. [20] and
adapted to this context.
4 From data to true values
4.1 Learning from observations: creating or modifying knowledge?
Every measurement is made with the purpose of increasing the knowledge of the
person who performs it, and of anybody else who may be interested in it, like the members
of a scientific community. It is clear that the need to perform a measurement indicates
that one is in a state of uncertainty with respect to something, e.g. the value of a well-
defined physics quantity. In all cases, the measurement has the purpose of modifying a
given state of knowledge. One might be tempted to say ‘acquire’, instead of ‘modify’, the
state of knowledge, thus indicating that the knowledge could be created from nothing by
the act of measuring. However, it is not difficult to see that, in all cases, what we are
dealing with is just an updating process, in the light of new facts and of some reason.
To give an example about which everyone has good intuition, let us take the case of the
measurement of the temperature in a room, using a digital thermometer (just to avoid
uncertainty in the reading), and let us suppose that we get 21.7 ◦C. Although we may
be uncertain about the tenths of a degree, there is no doubt that the measurement will
have narrowed the interval of temperatures considered possible before the measurement:
those compatible with the physiological feeling of a comfortable environment. According
to our knowledge of the thermometer used, or of thermometers in general, there will be
values of temperature in a given interval around 21.7 ◦C in which we believe more and
values outside the interval in which we believe less. It is, however, also clear that if the
thermometer had indicated, for the same physiological feeling, 17.3 ◦C, we might suspect
that it was not well calibrated, while if it had indicated 2.5 ◦C we would have no doubt
that the instrument was not working properly.
The three cases correspond to three different degrees of modification of the knowl-
edge. In particular, in the last case the modification is null (but even in this case we have
learned something: the thermometer does not work!).
So, what makes us improve our knowledge after an empirical observation, is not the
observation alone, but the observation framed in prior knowledge about measurand and
measurement. Trained physicists always have such prior knowledge and often use it un-
consciously. Imagine someone who has no scientific or technical education at all, entering
a physics laboratory and reading a number on an instrument: His scientific knowledge will
not improve at all, apart from the triviality that a given instrument displayed a number
(not much of a contribution to knowledge!)
4.2 From the probability of the observables to the probability of the true
values
Summarizing the argument so far, after having performed an experiment, which
has resulted in the observed value x being read on an instrument, there are some values
of the physical quantity (generically indicated by µ) in which we believe more (we say
‘they are more probable’) and some others in which we believe less. The different possible
true values can be characterized by a p.d.f. f(µ | x), conditioned by the observation x. To
be more precise, f(µ) depends on many other pieces of information, like knowledge of the
instruments, of the kind of measurement, and of reasonable values of µ to be expected.
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So using K() to indicate the ‘knowledge’, to be precise, we should write
f(µ | x)→ f(µ | x,K(instr.), K(meas.), K(µ)) ,
although one often simply writes f(µ | x), or even f(µ), implicitly assuming the conditions.
Clearly, f(µ | x) cannot be evaluated as relative frequencies of a long-run experi-
ment. It would be absurd to imagine a distribution of the values of µ for a given value x
read on the instrument, as true values are not directly observable, being related to abstract
concepts. Instead, relative frequencies can be used to evaluate the detector response:
f(x |µ) ≡ f(x |µ,K(instr.),K(meas.)).
This can be done either by calibration with respect to a reference value or by Monte Carlo
simulation, as is currently done when µ refers to a quantity for which a calibration cannot
be made.5) More often, f(x |µ) is evaluated by reasonable assumptions, like when we
assume a Gaussian model of error distribution, or that the observed number of accidental
coincidences is described by a Poisson distribution. For example, one has to remember
that, no matter how much the off-timing distribution might be Poisson-like, this empirical
observation cannot be considered, strictly speaking, a proof, having the same strength as
mathematical theorem. Nevertheless, the fact that this observation will lead practically
all researchers to believe a certain hypothesis makes it a typical example of the type of
inferential process we are talking about.
The function f(x |µ) is usually called likelihood, since it quantifies how likely it is
that µ will produce any given x. Note that this function can be easily misinterpreted: As
a probability density function it is a function of x, since it describes the beliefs on x for a
given value of µ. As a mathematical function it is also a function of µ in the sense that the
p.d.f. f(x |µ) depends on the ‘parameter’ µ. However, it is not correct to say that f(x |µ)
measures the belief that x comes from µ (in the sense that the observable x has to be
attributed to the true value µ). Instead, this degree of belief is denoted by f(µ | x). The
confusion6) between f(µ | x) and f(x |µ) is a source of really terrible mistakes [18, 20].
So, the problem is how to get from the observation x to f(µ). Before going to the
formal derivation of the formula to update the beliefs, let us try to justify intuitively the
general rule, considering what happens when µ can assume only two values. If they seem
to us equally possible, it is natural to favour the value which gives the highest likelihood of
producing x. For example, assuming µ1 = −1, µ2 = 10, considering a Gaussian likelihood
with σ = 3, and having observed x = 2, one would tend to believe that the observation
is most likely caused by µ1. If, on the other hand, we add the extra information that
the quantity of interest is positive, then µ1 is no longer the most probable cause but an
impossible one; µ2 becomes certain. There are, in general, intermediate cases in which,
because of previous knowledge, one tends to believe a priori more in one or other of the
causes. (For example, one could imagine a small Monte Carlo in which µ1 and µ2 are
randomly chosen with probability ratio 1 to 105: where, then, does x = 2 come from?) It
follows that, in the light of a new observation, the degree of belief of a given value of µ
will be proportional to
5) Note that a Monte Carlo program is nothing but a summary of the most reliable beliefs about the
phenomenology and the measurement process under study.
6) Anticipating what will become clear in a while: if the prior is uniform, then f(x |µ) and f(µ |x) have
identical mathematical expression. This is the reason why the likelihood curve is often taken as if it
were probability information about µ.
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– the likelihood that µ will produce the observed effect;
– the degree of belief attributed to µ before the observation, quantified by f◦(µ) (the
‘prior’).
We have finally
f(µ | x) ∝ f(x |µ) · f◦(µ) . (2)
This is one of the ways of writing Bayes’ theorem. The proportionality factor is simply
given by the normalization of f(µ | x) to 1. At this point it is important to write Bayes’
formula once more, making all conditions explicit:
f(µ | x ,K(instr.),K(meas.),K
◦
(µ)) ∝ f(x |µ,K(instr.),K(meas.)) · f(µ |K◦(µ)) ,
where f(µ |K◦(µ)) ≡ f◦(µ).
4.3 Derivation of Bayes’ theorem from a physicist’s perspective
The concepts illustrated in the previous section can be formalized using the fol-
lowing reasoning.
– Before doing the experiment we are uncertain on µ and on x: we know neither
the true value, nor the observed value. Generally speaking, this uncertainty is
quantified by f(µ, x).
– Under the hypothesis that we observe x, we can calculate the conditional proba-
bility
f(µ | x) = f(µ, x)
f(x)
=
f(µ, x)∫
f(µ, x) dµ
. (3)
– At this point, it seems we are stuck, because we are usually more uncertain about
{µ, x} than about µ. However, we note that f(µ, x) can be calculated from f(x |µ)
and f(µ):
f(µ, x) = f(x |µ) · f(µ) . (4)
This is the key observation to solve our problem.
– If we do an experiment we need to have a good idea of the behaviour of the
apparatus, therefore f(x |µ) must be a narrow distribution. The most uncertain
contribution remains the prior knowledge about µ, quantified by f◦(µ) (the sub-
script is to remind us that this is a prior about µ). Note that it is all right that
f◦(µ) is rather broad (‘vague’), because we want to learn about µ itself, performing
an experiment with an apparatus having a narrow response around true values.
– Putting all the pieces together we get the standard formula of Bayes’ theorem for
uncertain quantities:
f(µ | x) = f(x |µ) · f◦(µ)∫
f(x |µ) · f◦(µ) dµ . (5)
The steps followed in this proof of the theorem should convince the reader that f(µ | x)
calculated in this way is the most we can say about µ with the given state of information.
One may be worried about the presence of f◦(µ) in the result; but this is simply
unavoidable, and for this reason we should be relaxed about it [19]. f◦(µ) becomes ir-
relevant in routine cases because the likelihood is usually very narrow (when seen as a
mathematical function of µ) with respect to f◦(µ), such that the prior is reabsorbed in
9
the normalization factor.7) In contrast, in the sophisticated frontier-science measurements
f◦(µ) does matter, as will be illustrated below.
Let us conclude this very short introduction on Bayesian inference.
– It is impossible to give a probabilistic result on a physics quantity without passing
through priors (“it is impossible to make the inferential omelette without breaking
the Bayesian egg”, some like to say).
– When the probabilistic result seems not to depend on priors, we are in a condition
(or we make the tacit assumption!) in which the prior distribution acts as a con-
stant; this approximation is very good when the likelihood is much narrower than
the prior, as usually happens in routine measurements.
– In frontier science, priors must be considered with much care, and this will be the
main task of this paper.
5 Inferring gravitational-wave burst rate
5.1 Modelling the inferential process
Now that the inferential scheme has been set up, let us rephrase our problem in
the language of Bayesian statistics:
– the physical quantity of interest, and with respect to which we are in a state of
great uncertainty, is the g.w. burst rate r;
– we are practically sure about the expected rate of background events rb (but not
about the number which will actually be observed);
– what is certain is the number nc of coincidences which have been observed (stating
that the observed number of coincidences is nc ±√nc does not make any sense!),
although we do not know how many of these events have to be attributed to
background and how many (if any) to g.w. bursts.
For a given hypothesis r the number of coincidence events which can be observed in the
observation time T is described by a Poisson process having an intensity which is the sum
of that due to background and that due to signal. Therefore the likelihood is
f(nc | r, rb) = e
−(r+rb)T ((r + rb) T )
nc
nc!
, (6)
and, making use of Bayes’ theorem, we get
f(r |nc, rb) ∝ e
−(r+rb) T ((r + rb) T )
nc
nc!
f◦(r) . (7)
At this point we are faced with the problem of what f◦(r) to choose. The best way
of understanding why this choice can be troublesome is to illustrate the problem with
numerical examples. Let us consider T as unit time (e.g. one month), a background rate
rb such that rb × T = 1, and the following hypothetical observations: nc = 0; nc = 1;
nc = 5.
7) To make it clear, if one wants to measure the temperature in a room one does not choose a thermometer
with an r.m.s. error of 5 degrees, because one’s physiological prior is more accurate than what could
be learned from such a measurement; but the same instrument provides useful information at 200◦C
or at -50◦C.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the values of the rate r, in units of events/month, inferred from an
expected rate of background events rb = 1 event/month, an initial uniform distribution f◦(r) = k
and the following numbers of observed events: 0 (continuous); 1 (dashed); 5 (dotted).
5.2 Uniform prior
One might think that a good ‘democratic’ choice would be a uniform distribution
in r, i.e. f◦(r) = k. Inserting this prior in (7) and normalizing the final distribution we
get (see e.g. Ref. [20])
f(r |nc, rb, f◦(r) = k) = e
−r T ((r + rb) T )
nc
nc!
∑nc
n=0
(rb T )n
n!
. (8)
The resulting final distributions are shown in Fig. 1. For nc = 0 and 1 the distributions are
peaked at zero, while for nc = 5 the distribution appears so neatly separated from r = 0
that it seems a convincing proof that the postulated physics process searched-for does
exist. In the cases nc = 0 and 1, researchers usually present the result with an upper limit
(typically 95%), on the basis that f(r) seems compatible with no effect, as suggested by
Fig. 1. For example, in the simplest and well-known case of nc = 0 the 95% C.L. upper
limit is 3 events/month. The usual meaning one attributes to the limit is that, if the
physics process of interest exists, then there is a 95% probability that its rate is below 3
events/month, resulting from
∫ 3
0
f(r |nc = 0, rb = 1, f◦(r) = k) dr = 0.95 . (9)
But there are other infinite probabilistic statements that can be derived from f(r | rb, nc =
0). For example, P (r > 3 events/month) = 5%, P (r > 0.1 events/month) = 90%, P (r >
0.01 events/month) = 99%, and so on. Without doubt, researchers will not hesitate to
publish the 95% upper limit, but they would feel uncomfortable stating that they believe
99% that, if the g.w. bursts exist at all, then the rate is above 0.01 events/month.8) The
reason for this uneasiness can be found in the uniform prior, which might not correspond
8) If one assesses a probability value of 99%, one should be as confident that the event will turn out to be
true as one would be of extracting a white ball from an urn containing 99 white balls and one black.
If this is not the case, one is, consciously or not, responsible for misinformation. So, other people,
trusting the person who made that probability assessment, will form their opinion and make their
decisions using a probability value which does not correspond to what that person believes.
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to the prior knowledge that researchers really have. Let us, then, examine more closely the
meaning of the uniform distribution and its consequences. Saying that f◦(r) = k, means
that dP/dr = k, i.e. P ∝ ∆r; for example,
P (0.1 ≤ r ≤ 1) = 1
10
P (1 ≤ r ≤ 10) = 1
100
P (10 ≤ r ≤ 100) . . . , (10)
and so on. But, taken literally, this prior is hardly ever reasonable. The problem is not
due to the divergence for r → ∞ which makes f◦(r) not normalizable (these kinds of
distributions are called ‘improper’). This mathematical nuisance is automatically cured
when f◦(r) is multiplied by the likelihood, which, for a finite number of observed events,
vanishes rapidly enough for r → ∞. A much more serious problem is related to the fact
that the uniform distribution assigns to all the infinite orders of magnitude left of 1 a
probability which is only 1/9 of the probability of the decade between 1 and 10, or 1%
of the probability of the first two decades, and so on. This is the reason why, even if no
coincidence events have been observed, the final distribution obtained from zero events
observed (continuous curve of Fig. 1) implies that P (r ≥ 1 event/month) = 37%.
5.3 Jeffreys’ prior
A prior distribution alternative to the uniform can be based on the observation that
what often seems uniform is not the probability per unit of r, but rather the probability
per decade of r, i.e. researchers may feel equally uncertain about the orders of magnitudes
of r, namely
P (0.1 ≤ r ≤ 1) = P (1 ≤ r ≤ 10) = P (10 ≤ r ≤ 100) . . . . (11)
This implies that dP/d ln r = k, or dP/dr ∝ 1/r. This prior is known as Jeffreys’ prior [43],
and it is indeed very interesting, at least from a very abstract point of view (though it
tends to be misused, as is discussed in Ref. [19]). If we take Jeffreys’ prior literally, it does
not work in our case either. In fact, when inserted in Ref. (7), it produces a divergence
for r → 0. This is due to the infinite orders of magnitude left of 1, to each of which we
give equal prior probability, and to the fact that the likelihood (6) goes to a constant for
r → 0. Therefore, for any r◦ > 0, we have P (r < r◦)/P (r > r◦) = ∞. To get a finite
result we need a cut-off at a given rmin.
As an exercise, just to get a feeling of both the difference with respect to the case
of the uniform distribution, and the dependence on the cut-off, we report in Fig. 2 the
results obtained for the same experimental conditions as Fig. 1, but with a Jeffreys’ prior
truncated at rmin = 0.1 and 0.01. One can see that the final distributions conditioned
by 0 or 1 events observed are pulled towards r = 0 by the new priors, while the case of
nc = 5 is more robust, although it is no longer nicely separated from zero.
5.4 Role of priors
The strong dependence of the final distributions on the priors shown in this ex-
ample should not be considered a bad feature, as were an artifact of Bayesian inference.
Putting it the other way round, the Bayesian inference reproduces, in a formal way, what
researchers already have clear in their minds as a result of intuition and experience. In the
numerical examples we are dealing with, the dependence of the final distributions on the
priors is just a hint of the fact that the experimental data are not so strong as to lead every
scientist to the same conclusion (in other words, the experimental and theoretical situa-
tion is far from the well-established one upon which intersubjectivity is based). For this
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Figure 2: Final distributions for the same experimental configuration of Fig. 1, but with a
Jeffreys’ prior with cut-off at rmin = 0.01 events/month (left plot) and rmin = 0.1 events/month
(right plot).
reason, one should worry, instead, about statistical methods which advertise ‘objective’
probabilistic results in such a critical situation.
When the experimental situation is more solid, as for example in the case of five
events observed out of only 0.1 expected from background, the conclusions become very
similar, virtually independent of the priors (see Fig. 3), unless the priors reflected really
widely differing opinions.
The possibility that scientists might have distant and almost non-overlapping pri-
ors, such that agreement is reached only after a huge amount of very convincing data,
should not be overlooked, as this is, in fact, the typical situation in frontier research.
Even 100 events observed out of 0.1 expected from background are not a logical proof of
the existence of bursts, since the observation is not in contradiction with the background
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Figure 3: Distribution of the values of the rate r, in units of events/month, inferred from five
observed events, an expected rate of background events rb = 0.1 events/month, and the following
priors: uniform distribution f◦(r) = k (continuous); Jeffreys’ prior truncated at rmin = 0.01
(dashed). The case of the Jeffreys’ priors is also reported for rb = 1 event/month (dotted).
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alone. Nevertheless, any reasonable physicist will agree that this is highly unlikely (we
shall come back to evolution of beliefs in Section 7.3.)
5.5 Priors reflecting the positive attitude of researchers
Having clarified the role of priors in the assessment of probabilistic statements
about true values, and their critical influence on frontier-research results, it is clear that,
in our opinion, “reference priors do not exist” [19, 44]. However, we find that the “concept
of a ‘minimal informative’ prior specification - appropriately defined!” [45] can sometimes
be useful, if the practitioner is aware of the assumptions behind the specification.
We can now ask ourselves what would be a prior specification common to ratio-
nal and responsible people who have planned, financed and operated frontier-type ex-
periments. This is what we call the positive attitude of researchers [20]. Certainly, the
researchers believed there was a good chance, depending on the kind of measurement,
that they would end up with a number of candidate events well above the background;
or that the physical quantity of interest was well above the experimental resolution; or
that a certain rate would be in the region of sensitivity. One can show that the results
obtained with reasonable prior distributions, chosen to model this positive attitude, are
very similar to those obtainable by an improper uniform prior and, in particular, the
upper/lower bounds obtained are very stable (see Sections 5.4.3 and 9.1.1 of Ref. [20]).
Let us apply this idea to the exercise we are dealing with: 0, 1 or 5 events observed
over a background of 1 event (Fig. 1). Searching for a rare process with a detector having a
background of 1 event/month, for an exposure time of one month, a positive attitude would
be to think that signal rates of several events per month are rather possible. On the other
hand, the fact that the process is considered to be rare implies that one does not expect
a very large rate (i.e. large rates would contradict previous experimental information),
and also that there is some belief that the rate could be very small, virtually zero. Let us
assume that the researchers are almost sure that the rate is below 30 events/month. We
can consider, as examples, the following prior distributions.
– A uniform distribution between 0 and 30:
f◦(r) = 1/30 (0 ≤ r ≤ 30). (12)
– A triangular distribution:
f◦(r) =
1
450
(30− r) (0 ≤ r ≤ 30). (13)
– A half-Gaussian distribution of σ◦ = 10
f◦(r) =
2√
2pi σ◦
exp
[
− r
2
2 σ2
◦
]
(r ≥ 0). (14)
The last two functions model the fact that researchers might believe that small values of
r are more possible than high values, as is often the case. Moreover, the half-Gaussian
distribution also models the more realistic belief that rates above 30 events/month are not
excluded, although they are considered very unlikely.9) The three priors are shown in the
upper plot of Fig. 4. The resulting final distributions are shown in the lower plot of the
9) We will see in Section 7.2 that realistic priors can be roughly modelled by a log-normal distribution.
With parameters chosen to describe the positive attitude we are considering, this distribution would
give results practically equivalent to the three priors we are using now.
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same figure. The three solutions are practically indistinguishable, and, in particular, very
similar to the results obtained by an improper uniform distribution (Fig. 1). This suggests
that the improper uniform prior represents a practical and easy way of representing the
prior specification for this kind of problem if one assumes what we have called the posi-
tive attitude of the researchers. Therefore, this prior could represent a way of reporting
conventional probabilistic results, if one is aware of the limits of the convention. Seeking
a truly objective probabilistic result — we like to stress the concept again — is a dream.
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Figure 4: The upper plot shows some reasonable priors reflecting the positive attitude of re-
searchers: uniform distribution (continuous); triangular distribution (dashed); half-Gaussian dis-
tribution (dotted). The lower plot shows how the results of Fig. 1, obtained starting from an
improper uniform distribution, (do not) change if, instead, the priors of the upper plot are used.
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6 Prior-free presentation of the experimental evidence
At this point, we want to reassure the reader (who we imagine at this point to be
swirling around in the stormy sea of subjectivism) that it is possible to present data in an
‘objective’ way, on the condition that all thoughts of providing probabilistic results about
the measurand are suspended.
Let us take again Bayes’ theorem (Eq. (2)), which we rewrite here in terms of the
uncertain quantities of interest
f(r |nc, rb) ∝ f(nc | r, rb) · f◦(r) , (15)
and consider only two possible values of r, let them be r1 and r2. From (15) it follows
that
f(r1 |nc, rb)
f(r2 |nc, rb) =
f(nc | r1, rb)
f(nc | r2, rb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor
· f◦(r1)
f◦(r2)
. (16)
This is a common way of rewriting the result of the Bayesian inference for a couple of
hypotheses, keeping the contributions due to the experimental evidence and to the prior
knowledge separate. The ratio of likelihoods is known as the Bayes factor and it quantifies
the ratio of evidence provided by the data in favour of either hypothesis. The Bayes factor
is considered to be practically objective because likelihoods (i.e. probabilistic description
of the detector response) are usually much less critical than priors about the physics
quantity of interest.10)
The Bayes factor can be extended to a continuous set of hypotheses r, considering
a function which gives the Bayes factor of each value of r with respect to a reference value
rREF . The reference value could be arbitrary, but for our problem the choice rREF = 0,
giving
R(r;nc, rb) = f(nc | r, rb)
f(nc | r = 0, rb) , (17)
is very convenient for comparing and combining the experimental results [46, 47, 48]. The
function R has nice intuitive interpretations which can be highlighted by reordering the
terms of (16) in the form
f(r |nc, rb)
f◦(r)
/
f(r = 0 |nc, rb)
f◦(r = 0)
=
f(nc | r, rb)
f(nc | r = 0, rb) = R(r;nc, rb) (18)
(valid for all possible a priori r values). R has the probabilistic interpretation of relative
belief updating ratio, or the geometrical interpretation of shape distortion function of the
probability density function. R goes to 1 for r → 0, i.e. in the asymptotic region in which
the experimental sensitivity is lost: As long as it is 1, the shape of the p.d.f. (and therefore
the relative probabilities in that region) remains unchanged. Instead, in the limit R → 0
(for large r) the final p.d.f. vanishes, i.e. the beliefs go to zero no matter how strong
10) Note that this assumption might be questionable in the sophisticated field of g.w. search. For example,
the effects of local sources of noise in the detectors are not well understood. This is what makes a
substantial difference between a single detector and a coincidence experiment. The likelihood function
summarizes the best knowledge about the g.w. burst detection and identification, and about noise
behaviour, the tail of which can be very critical. In a coincidence experiment the detailed knowledge
of the background becomes uncritical, as the only relevant hypothesis which makes accidental coinci-
dence described by a Poisson distribution is the stationarity of the experimental conditions over the
considered observation time.
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Figure 5: Relative belief updating ratio R for the Poisson intensity parameter r for the cases of
Fig. 1.
they were before. In the case of the Poisson process we are considering, the relative belief
updating factor becomes
R(r;nc, rb, T ) = e−r T
(
1 +
r
rb
)nc
, (19)
with the condition11) rb > 0 if nc > 0.
Figure 5 shows the R function for the numerical examples considered above. The
abscissa has been drawn in a log scale to make it clear that several orders of magnitude are
involved. These curves transmit the result of the experiment immediately and intuitively:
– whatever one’s beliefs on r were before the data, these curves show how one must12)
change them;
– the beliefs one had for rates far above 20 events/month are killed by the experi-
mental result;
– if one believed strongly that the rate had to be below 0.1 events/month, the data
are irrelevant;
– the case in which no candidate events have been observed gives the strongest
constraint on the rate r;
– the case of five candidate events over an expected background of one produces a
peak of R which corroborates the beliefs around 4 events/month only if there were
sizable prior beliefs in that region.
Moreover there are some technical advantages in reporting the R function as a result of
a search experiment.
– One deals with numerical values which can differ from unity only by a few orders
of magnitude in the region of interest, while the values of the likelihood can be
11) The case rb = nc = 0 yields R(r) = e−r, obtainable starting directly from Eq. (17), defining R,
and from Eq. (6), giving the likelihood. Also the case rb → ∞ has to be evaluated directly from the
definition of R and from the likelihood, yielding R = 1 ∀ r; finally, the case rb = 0 and nc > 0 makes
r = 0 impossible, thus prompting a claim for discovery – and it no longer makes sense for the R
function defined above to have that nice asymptotic behaviour in the insensitivity region.
12) It really is a ‘must’ and not a ‘suggestion’. In fact, although probabilities may depend on individuals
(‘subjective’), the way they are updated follows from standard logic (yielding Bayes’ theorem) and
thus is ‘objective’.
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extremely low. For this reason, the comparison between different results given by
the R function can be perceived better than if these results were published in
terms of likelihood.
– Since R differs from the likelihood only by a factor, it can be used directly in
Bayes’ theorem, which does not depend on constants, whenever probabilistic con-
siderations are needed.13) In fact,
f(r |nc rb) ∝ R(r;nc, rb) · f◦(r) . (20)
– The combination of different independent results on the same14) quantity r can be
done straightforwardly by multiplying individual R functions:
R(r; all data) = ΠiR(r; datai) . (21)
– Finally, one does not need to decide a priori if one wants to make a ‘discovery’
or an ‘upper limit’ analysis as conventional statistics teaches (see e.g. criticisms
in Ref. [41]): the R function represents the most unbiased way of presenting the
results and everyone can draw their own conclusions.
7 A case study based on realistic detector performances
7.1 Prior-free results
We now give a numerical example which uses the realistic parameters of an actual
g.w. antenna and simulates possible experimental outcomes that g.w. researchers could
be faced with. One of the best performances, in terms of sensitivity and duty cycle, was
obtained with the Explorer antenna in 1991 [26, 33]. The antenna worked with a duty
cycle of 67% for ≃ 180 days, i.e. 122 effective days, at a noise level of ≃ 8 mK (that is
in terms of signal amplitude h = 7 · 10−19). At the chosen threshold, h = 2.5 · 10−18, the
event rate was roughly 100 events/day. We shall take this as the reference value of the
background rate for our numerical examples.
We now imagine a coincidence analysis between two antennae having the 1991
Explorer characteristics, parallel to each other, far enough apart not to be sensitive to the
same local effects and being operated for 1000 days. We consider here a fixed window of
0.2 s (see e.g. Refs. [26] and [34]), yielding an expected number of accidental coincidences
of rb = 100 × 100 × 0.2/86400 = 0.02 events/day. The expected number of accidental
coincidences is, then, E[nc | rb, T ] = rb T = λb = 20 (the product rb T will be indicated
hereafter by λb). Let us consider the following numbers of observed coincidences: nc = 10,
15, 20, 24, 29, 33, 38, roughly corresponding to a difference between observation and
background expectation ranging from −2 to +4 standard deviations [σ(nc | λb) =
√
20].
The corresponding R values are shown in Fig. 6. We see that all results exclude rate values
above ≈ 0.1 bursts/day, while the experiment loses sensitivity below ≈ 0.001 bursts/day.
In the case of excess of observed coincidences above the background expectation (nc > λb),
the R function has a peak at rm = nc/T − rb, with a peak value of Rm = e−rm(nc/λb)nc .
The peak rises very rapidly with nc. For example, for nc = 38 the peak value is roughly
600, at rm = 1.8 · 10−2 bursts/day.
13) Note that, although it is important to present prior-free results, at a certain moment a probability
assessment about r can be important, for example, in forming one’s own idea about the most likely
range of r, or in taking decisions about planning and financing of future experiments.
14) See comments about the choice of the energy threshold in Section 10.2.
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Figure 6: Belief updating ratios on a log-log scale for different observations. The abscissa shows
the signal rate, in events per day. The continuous curve correspond to an observation equal to the
background, the other curves to a difference between observation and background expectation
ranging from −2 to +4 standard deviations. The grey curve (+4 st. dev.) is the case that will
be studied in more detail (see Figs. 7, 8 and 9).
7.2 Turning the results into probabilities
A peak value of 600 might seem impressive, especially if ‘advertised’ on a proper
scale (in linear scale the plateau level R = 1 will be confused with 0, and the curve
f(r |nc = 38) will appear very well separated from r = 0), and could easily convince
non-experts that the searched-for signal exists. Nevertheless, confronted to such a result,
there could be experts with strong physically motivated priors who would still maintain
their scepticism, while others would hesitate. The reason is that in this domain of research
prior knowledge is largely non-intersubjective. Even researchers who are members of the
same experimental team do not usually share the same opinion, and the case of 38 events
over an expectation of 20 is typical of those cases over which there could be disagree-
ment: disagreement which could cause the result to be left unpublished for years, unless
a charismatic and optimistic team spokesman persuaded his fellows to claim a discovery.
It is interesting to use Bayes’ theorem in a reversed mode to understand which kind
of prior produces sceptical, hesitant and optimistic reactions. (We assume that researchers
act in good faith and that they care about their reputation.) Above we have met two
classes of priors: the uniform in r and the uniform in log r. One can easily imagine their
effects, on the basis of the discussion concerning the example in Section 5 (see Figs. 1–3).
But we do not think that there is a single physicist whose prior beliefs correspond exactly
to those of Eq. (10) or (11). It is much more reasonable to expect that someone would
have a rough idea of the order of magnitude of g.w. burst rate, provided that they exist at
all. Now, an easy way to model an uncertain order of magnitude is to think of a normal
distribution in log r, with most of the probability mass concentrated in some decades.
The corresponding distribution of r is called lognormal. Although this parametrization
is, like any other, rough, it has some formal advantages which somehow reflect the prior
knowledge of researchers: varying the two parameters of the distribution, one can choose
the orders of magnitude of the value where the beliefs are concentrated; the probability
density function goes to zero as r → 0 (in agreement with the working hypothesis that
the searched-for signal does exist, and hence at a non-null rate); the probability density
function is defined for all positive values of r, thus capable of persuading even initially
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Table 1: Dependence of initial and final probability for r ≥ 0.01 bursts/day as a function of the
prior parameters (see text).
Reaction Prior parameters P (r ≥ 0.01 burst/day)
E[log10(r)] σ(log10(r)) prior final
sceptical −4 0.5 3.2 · 10−5 0.9%
hesitant −3 0.5 2.3% 50%
optimistic −2 0.5 50% 85%
very sceptical people to change their mind as soon as the accumulated evidence starts to
produce a narrow peak in R. When this situation of strong evidence is achieved, scientific
conclusions (summarized in the final probability density function) will not depend on the
details of the priors: All researchers will agree on the interpretation and the result will be
considered objective (although, we repeat, it is only intersubjective).
Considering the situation of 38 events observed over an expected background of
20 events, the prior knowledge corresponding to the subsequent sceptical, hesitant and
optimistic reactions can be modelled with a Gaussian in lr = log10(r) having standard
deviation 0.5 (i.e. half a decade) and averages of −4, −3 and −2. Table 1 gives the
parameters of the three priors, as well as the probabilities that r is above 0.01 bursts/day
before and after the new experimental data. Figures 7 and 8 show the modelled priors and
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Figure 7: Pessimistic (continuous), optimistic (dotted) priors plotted in different scales [lr stands
for log10(r)]. The dashed line represents an intermediate situation. The grey curve is the R
function for 38 observed events out of 20 expected.
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the corresponding final distributions. The figures are drawn with several scales because
each way of representing them can help one to get a feeling of what is going on.
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Figure 8: Several representations of the final distributions resulting from the three different
priors of Fig. 7 and the evidence from 38 observed events out of 20 events expected from back-
ground (grey curve of Fig. 7). Note that the f stands for the generic symbol of p.d.f., but its
mathematical function depends on the variable via the Jacobian.
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7.3 Evolution of beliefs
We conclude this section with some remarks about the choice of the priors used to
illustrate this situation. First, it is clear that the chosen model is important, but what we
want to show is the rough distribution of beliefs. For example, although different param-
eters of the lognormal, or a different function of the probability, will produce numerical
variations in the probability of the sceptical reaction, the qualitative conclusions will not
change: Nobody possesses a psychological perception of probability which enables them
to tell exactly whether their intuitive probability is 0.5, 1 or 2%. What matters is that
these probabilities are perceived as rather low and well separated from the range which
characterizes hesitation (≈ 40–60%) or almost certainty (' 90–95%). Second, although
we are not going to enter into the detail of trying to explain why the three different
researchers have such different priors, it is important to understand that, since we have
in mind real researchers, priors are not simply abstract, aesthetic or philosophical ideas
about the physical quantity. They summarize a complex prior knowledge, based on pre-
vious experimental observations as well as on theoretical ideas related to this and other
observables (we shall come back to this point in Section 9). For example, looking at the
numbers in Table 1 and the plots in Fig. 8 one could easily imagine that if the sceptical
person was faced for a second time with independent evidence of similar strength to that
provided by the 38 observed events (which could again come from antenna data, but also
from other astrophysical information), he/she could be now in a situation similar to that
of the hesitant person and the next time could be in the situation of the optimistic per-
son. This evolution is illustrated in Fig. 9, which shows the p.d.f. of the initially sceptical
researcher as he/she is faced four consecutive times with such rather strong (and quantita-
tively identical – clearly an academic exercise) evidence. After the fourth occasion, he/she
will be strongly convinced that the rate is well above 10−2 bursts/day (see dotted curve
of Fig. 9). Asymptotically, when a large number of pieces of evidence are in hand, the
beliefs will be concentrated around the peak of the likelihood (i.e. 1.8 · 10−2 bursts/day),
as the prior distribution becomes irrelevant.15)
8 Reporting a result with an upper/lower bound
Although the R function (which, we repeat, contains the same information as the
likelihood function, but has the practical advantages we have illustrated) represents the
most complete and unbiased way of reporting the result, it might also be convenient to
express with just one number the result of a search which is considered by the researchers
to be unfruitful. Before trying to give some recommendations, it is important to start by
saying that any attempt to find a precise prescription, with the hope that a single number
will summarize the experimental information completely, is a false endeavour. Nowadays
it is not difficult, in fact, to provide the complete function R, parametrized in some way,
no matter how complicated R might be. This parametrization could be posted on a web
page, or sent on request, if it was too voluminous for a published paper, as might be the
case for multidimensional problems, or if several R functions are obtained, depending on
15) Given the rough modelling of the sceptical prior of this numerical example, one needs about 20
exposures to evidence of the kind considered, before the barycentre of the final distribution reaches
the simulated ‘true value’ of 1.8 · 10−2 bursts/day. This is due to the rapidly decreasing tail of the
log-normal distribution. It seems to us that, outside the order of magnitude considered more probable,
the intuitive priors of experienced physicists for this kind of frontier physics quantity have flatter tails.
As a consequence, once the final distribution has moved from the decades that one believed to be
more probable, the convergence to the true value becomes faster.
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Figure 9: Evolution of the p.d.f of a sceptical person (the grey curve is his/her initial prior)
updated four times by independent evidence characterized by the same R function provided by
38 observed events over an expected background of 20. Top and bottom plots differ only by the
scales.
different assumptions about systematic effects or about the underlying phenomenology.16)
If, anyway, one wants to report the result considered inconclusive as a single num-
ber17) having the meaning of a bound, Fig. 6 suggests that this number should be in the
region of r where R has a transition from 1 to 0. This value would then delimit (although
roughly) the region in which the r values are most likely to be excluded from the region
in which it is most likely that the true value lies. One may take, for example, the value
of r for which R(r) = 5% or 1% of the insensitivity plateau18) value (i.e. 0.05 or 0.01),
16) For example, the ZEUS Collaboration has recently published polynomial parametrizations of log-
likelihoods, which contain the same amount of information of R, for each possible coupling of new
contact interactions between electrons and quarks [47].
17) As is well known, in the case that R depends on two parameters, like in neutrino oscillation analyses,
one obtains a contour plot.
18) One could choose, alternatively, a value corresponding to a percentage of the maximum of the like-
lihood, and hence of R. As a convention, this could work as well, but: a) there is a problem of how
to handle local maxima of the likelihood in cases more complicated than the one under study; b) if
the maximum of R is high enough, the R function corresponding to the bound could be larger than
1. Note that, in the case of local maxima and minima of R, the condition R(r) = 5% or 1% yields
multiple solutions. In this case it seems to us natural to choose the one farthest from the insensitivity
region.
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or any other conventional number. What is important is not to call this value a bound
at a given probability level (or at a given confidence level – the perception of the result
by the user will be the same! [18]). This would be incorrect. In fact the R function is not
sufficient by itself for assessing a probabilistic statement about the quantity of interest.
If we had to suggest a possible convention for the upper bound, it would be to
choose rL such that R(rL) = 5%. The advantage of this convention is that it is easy
to recover standard limits19) based on the rule “upper limit equals 3” (divided by the
observation time) when no events are observed. In this case, in fact, the likelihood is
f(nc = 0 | r) = e−r T , and also R(r ; nc = 0) = e−r T . Moreover, a standard Bayesian
inference with f◦(r) = k (see discussion in Section 5.5) produces the same
20) upper bound
[Eq. (9)].
We end this discussion about summarizing the objective result provided by the R
function in one number with a few cautionary remarks. First, we repeat that this result
should not be called a 95% confidence level upper bound. Second, as can easily be seen
from Fig. 6, we do not think that it is worthwhile trying to define a conventional limit
with the precision of a percentage level. Even defining the limit precisely, the expected
statistical fluctuations of results from one experiment to another can easily change rL by
≈ 50%. Therefore, if one really wants to quote a number for the upper limit, together
with the R function, one should simply state the order of magnitude21) of rL obtained,
for example, with the R = 5% convention.
Finally, if one is interested in a limit having a probabilistic statement, one has to
pass through the priors. In this case a possible way of producing conventional probabilistic
limits would be to use a uniform distribution, as discussed in Section 5.5. Upper bounds
calculated as 95% probability upper limits for the results of Fig. 6 are given in Table 2
and are compared with the bounds obtained using the R = 5% rule. We see that the
results are very similar, if we remember that high accuracy in these bounds is not needed,
as discussed above.22)
Table 2: Comparison of the upper bounds obtained on the rate r using the R = 5% rule, or
evaluated as a 95% probability upper limit given by a Bayesian inference with uniform priors,
with reference to the example of Section 7.1 (see Fig. 6). The values of the upper bounds are
rounded to remember that we do not consider their exact value to be relevant (more digits are
given within parentheses).
Observed number of events 10 15 20 24 29 33 38
95% prob. (10−2 evts/day) 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 2 2 3
(0.51) (0.73) (1.06) (1.43) (1.96) (2.41) (2.98)
R = 5% rule (10−2 evts/day) 0.5 0.8 1.3 2 3 4 5
(0.54) (0.81) (1.30) (1.91) (2.90) (3.83) (5.13)
19) In this particular case the coincidence of the result obtained by the frequentistic prescription, the
R(rL) = 5% convention, and the standard Bayesian result is due to a numerical effect due to the
particular likelihood.
20) In the most general case, the 95% probability bound limit will be different from that obtained by the
R = 5% convention, and this is all right as the meaning of the two bounds is different (see previous
footnote).
21) For a discussion about the significant digits of limits, see Sections 9.1.4 and 9.3.5 of Ref. [20].
22) Another argument to understand our point is that the upper/lower limits should be considered to
belong to the same category of uncertainties, and not of true values.
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9 Does the searched-for process exist?
We have seen how to make the inference about the g.w. burst rate r, under the
assumption that g.w. bursts exist. At this point some readers might have the objection
that they are not interested in the values of the rate, but rather in whether g.w. bursts
exist at all.
It is quite well understood by scientists and philosophers that, while the observa-
tion of a phenomenon proves its existence, non-observation does not prove non-existence
(the classic example that philosophers like for this reasoning is that of the black swan).
In our case, the problem is complicated by the fact that even the observations are not
certain proof of the existence. This is because, as long as some background events are
expected, we cannot be absolutely (mathematically) sure that the searched-for signal has
been observed, no matter how many events are observed above those statistically expected
from background alone. This argument concerns not only the frontier problems we are
dealing with in this paper, but all theoretical concepts, including true values of physi-
cal quantities. So, to speak rigorously, we should only talk about beliefs. “Nevertheless,
physics is objective, or at least that part of it that is at present well established, if we
mean by ‘objective’ that a rational individual cannot avoid believing it. . . . The reason is
that, after centuries of experimentation, theoretical work and successful predictions, there
is such a consistent network of beliefs, that it has acquired the status of an objective con-
struction: one cannot mistrust one of the elements of the network without contradicting
many others. Around this solid core of objective knowledge there are fuzzy borders which
correspond to areas of present investigations, where the level of intersubjectivity is still
very low.”[20] As a consequence, it is not a question of proving or disproving something
(unless some impossible consequences have been observed), but rather of how difficult it
is to insert/remove something in/from what is considered to be the most likely network
of beliefs.
Applying these considerations to the case study, the answer to the question whether
or not g.w. bursts exist involves a complex knowledge of astrophysical and cosmological
facts and theories. As a consequence, we tend to believe that they could exist until the
experimental evidence is such that even the lowest conceivable rates of bursts carrying
enough energy to pass the effective energy threshold, evaluated by the best of our knowl-
edge, are ruled out. On the other hand, we tend to believe that they have really been
observed experimentally when energy, rates and shapes of the signals match with the rest
of the knowledge.23)
10 Dependence of the g.w. burst result on some systematic effects
This last section is dedicated to systematic effects on the result. Every experiment
belonging to the class of inference that we are treating in this paper has its own problem-
atics. We consider here only some of the effects which are more relevant for the case study
we are dealing with, although some of the problems are common to other experiments.
As a general recommendation, we find very helpful the detailed study of the sources of
uncertainty, as e.g. listed in the ISO Guide [49], and the use of conditional probability. For
a general scheme for the evaluation of uncertainties due to systematic effects, see Section
2.10.3 of Ref. [20].
23) For example, if one observed a very high rate of very energetic bursts, which seems incompatible with
the possible sources in the Universe, most physicists would tend to believe that there was something
wrong with the experiment.
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Returning to the inference of the g.w. burst rate, we have considered so far a
case study performed using realistic parameters, but we have assumed ideal conditions
concerning some aspects of the coincidence experiment. We will see below how the analysis
strategy changes if we assume that the background is not perfectly known, or if it is not
stationary; or if the physics process is not stationary. Before going into a discussion of
these effects we need to consider the uncertainty about the optimal coincidence window
and about the minimum g.w. energy to which the coincidence experiments are sensitive.
10.1 Choice of the coincidence window
The coincidence window should be set considering the physical behaviour of the
sources, the distance between the detectors and the detector characteristics, i.e. the limited
resolution introduced by the sampling time. But other effects can influence the choice, such
as the noise that distorts the events or the fact that real signals may have unexpected
shapes. So, in practice, the optimal coincidence window is usually chosen in order to
maximize SNR, as a compromise between the demands for a reduced rate of accidental
background on the one hand and for not missing physical events on the other. Therefore,
the choice of the coincidence window involves unavoidably some arbitrariness, and several
values of the window can be envisaged, to cope with the possible assumptions about the
signals looked for. As a conclusion, we do not think that there is just one way of reporting
results, and theR values corresponding to different reasonable choices should be presented
separately.
10.2 Uncertainty on the minimum energy of g.w. bursts
At this point, we need to define more precisely the quantity r which is the subject of
the measurement (the measurand). In fact, the case study assumed two parallel detectors
responding to the same physical event which produced the burst of g.w.’s irradiating the
Earth. This implies that r is the rate of g.w. bursts with energy greater than the highest
energy threshold24) of the two detectors. Calling the differential energy spectrum of g.w.
bursts φ(E) (= dr/dE), we have
r = r(Emin) ≡
∫
∞
Emin=Emaxthr
φ(E) dE , (22)
which states that r does, indeed, depend on the minimal energy Emin required for the
burst to be detected. This minimal energy is related to the maximum of the two threshold
energies (Emaxthr ). Obviously, one will be interested in measuring the detailed φ(E), when
the high sensitivity of future detectors will allow measurement of many burst candidates
for different energy thresholds.
It is easy to understand that the definition of the measurand given by Eq. (22)
does not correspond to what is actually detected. In fact there is not a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the energy resulting from the filter (Em) and the energy of the burst.
This is true for all kinds of measurements, with the only difference being that in the case
of g.w. detection the spread of Em around the true energy E can be rather large, depend-
ing on SNR. In fact, the intrinsic physical reason for this spread is noise: the measured
energy of the detected signal depends on the randomness of size and phase of the noise
24) We clarify that when we talk about energy, we really refer to g.w. energy, and not to mechanical
energy released to the antenna.
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at the moment of g.w. interaction [39, 50]. A further source of spread is the performance
of the filter used in the analysis, as shown in Ref. [34].
This kind of problem can be partially solved, at the expense of a greater uncertainty
about the measured quantity, if one is able to model the distortion of the spectrum φ(E)
into φ(Em). This can be done by mapping the transition probability E → Em with
a p.d.f. f(Em |E), which, in a discrete approximation, can be thought of as a transfer
matrix. The knowledge of this transfer matrix then allows φ(Em) to be unfolded to infer
φ(E).25) However, unfolding g.w. burst energy spectra goes beyond the purposes of this
paper. Therefore, hereafter it will be assumed that r corresponds to the definition of the
measurand given in Eq. (22).
10.3 Non-stationarity of the signal
Another assumption which entered in our previous considerations is that the g.w.
bursts have a constant rate during the observation time. This assumption is consistent with
the present status of knowledge and it leads researchers to model the arrival time of the
bursts with a Poisson process of constant intensity over the whole period of observation.
Nevertheless, one can envisage analysing the data with the hope of finding evidence for
g.w. bursts in a short period, perhaps triggered by other independent observations which
happened in the same period.26) With this possibility in mind, it is preferable to analyse
the data in subperiods, in order to exploit the potential of the information collected. The
result over the full period of observation can be easily recovered by merging the partial
results, as discussed in Section 6. It is easy to prove that, in fact, the result over the full
period during which the noise has been stationary is exactly the same as can be evaluated
by combining the subperiods, since
R = ΠiRi = e−r
∑
i
Ti
(
1 +
r
rb
)∑
i
nci
= e−r T
(
1 +
r
rb
)nc
, (23)
where T =
∑
i Ti and nc =
∑
i nci . For this reason, it is preferable to keep results on short
periods of observations separate.
10.4 Uncertainty on the value of the background rate
We have assumed that expected background rate is well known, as can be cross-
checked using the off-timing technique and estimation from individual background rates.
Nevertheless, one may be in a state of uncertainty about rb; for example if the observation
time is very small at a given level of background (see discussion below concerning the non-
stationarity of background). In this case rb will be an uncertain number too and so will
25) For examples of unfolding methods currently used in particle physics, when this kind of problem is
encountered, see Refs. [51], [53] and [52]. An elementary introduction to the problem of unfolding
methods, as well as of other simple methods, can be found in Ref. [54]. More sophisticated methods
for spectrum unfolding and, generally speaking, image reconstruction, are presented in Refs. [55] and
[56], respectively.
26) Given the actual levels of background in present-generation detectors, it is very unlikely that one would
be persuaded that a genuine train of g.w. bursts had really arrived in a short observation time, unless it
happened to be a truly spectacular phenomenon. Nevertheless, one could ‘gate’ the candidate events
by other pieces of evidence coming from independent sources of information concerning something
that happened in a narrow time window. Such independent information could be related to optical,
neutrino or γ-ray burst observations.
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be characterized by a p.d.f. f(rb). One then has a likelihood f(nc | r, rb) for each possible
value of rb. The likelihood which takes into account all possible values of rb, each weighted
with its degree of belief f(rb), is obtained by the rules of probability, yielding
f(nc | r) =
∫
f(nc | r, rb) f(rb) drb . (24)
The case of a well-known background rate (rb = rb◦) is recovered when f(rb)→ δ(rb−rb◦),
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. Note that f(nc | r) will no longer be a Poisson distri-
bution, and therefore the expression of the R function will also be more complicated than
that of Eq. (19), although this is just a computational complication. This consideration
leads to the prediction that the frequency distribution of random coincidences made over
a long period of time, during which rb fluctuates, can look quite different from a Poisson
distribution.
A last remark concerns the meaning of f(rb). This function is meant to describe
the uncertainty about the exact value of rb in a period which is considered to be stable to
the best of our knowledge, and not the measured frequency distribution of the background
rate during a long period. If one knows that different subperiods each had a different value
of rb (within the unavoidable uncertainty), this information must be used in a different
way, as will be shown in the next section.
10.5 Non-stationarity of the noise
One of the most important and unavoidable problems in coincidence experiments
is the non-stationarity of the noise. In fact, the chance of detecting a g.w. of minimum
energy Emin depends not only on the filter threshold but also on the level of noise. A high
level of noise acts as a high effective threshold for the g.w. signals, and, therefore, the
high rate of collected data with a filter threshold much lower than this effective threshold
contains no useful information for the coincidence analysis.
One might envisage two possible strategies for the data-taking of the individual
antenna.
– Fixed energy threshold, as, for example, used in Ref. [26]. The threshold is fixed at
a constant energy level independent of the detector noise. It follows that the event
rate due to the background varies according to the detector noise level. However,
as said above, this option does not imply that the rate of events due to g.w.’s is
constant.
– Varying energy threshold, as, for example, used in Ref. [39]. The threshold level
is given in terms of SNR, i.e. the energy of the threshold varies according to the
detector noise. The event rate due to the background remains constant, while that
due to the signals varies according to each threshold value (i.e. according to each
sensitivity level of the detector).
We are aware of the complexity of this problem, and a full treatment of it goes beyond
the purpose of this paper. However, we think that some general considerations can be
made. The basic observation is that, as far as possible, in the final analysis one should try
to keep the definition of the measurand fixed, as discussed above. If this goal is achieved
(within the unavoidable uncertainties), although only in subperiods, it easy to combine
of the results referring to the same measurand by multiplying the R functions of each
subperiod:
R = ΠiRi = Πie−r Ti
(
1 +
r
rbi
)nci
. (25)
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In contrast, results referring to different measurands, i.e. coincidences obtained at different
effective thresholds, should be kept separate.
As a consequence of the above considerations, the natural procedure seems to
be somewhat in between the two strategies outlined above. During the data-taking it is
preferable to vary the threshold setting in order to keep the SNR at its lowest possible value
and thus maximize the chance of detecting g.w. events. The large amount of background
events which are collected in this way can be reduced by applying a more sophisticated
selection before using the g.w. burst candidates for the coincidence procedure. Then, at
the moment of the final analysis, the data should be reorganized according to the effective
threshold of the less sensitive antenna (see Section 10.2). This is equivalent to performing
many experiments at different effective thresholds, the result of each of which should be
presented separately.
At this point, we think that a very simple simulation could help to make our points
clearer. Let us take a numerical example by considering the case of two periods over which
the system was stationary, with effective energy threshold Ethi (i = 1, 2). We take each
period of Ti = 1000 days, for a total observation time of 2000 days.
27) In each time interval
the background rate is indicated by rbi and we simulate nthi g.w. bursts, plus a number
of random coincidences exactly equal to the expectation value. Although the situation is
obviously oversimplified, we think that it should help to make the general considerations
more easily comprehensible.
10.5.1 Consequences of analysing together data taken at different effective thresholds
Let us consider rb1 = 0.02 events/day, yielding 20 background events in T1 at
the effective energy threshold Eth1 . At this energy threshold we simulate 18 genuine g.w.
bursts. The result of this simulation is therefore nc1 = 38 observed coincidences.
During the period T2 of a more noisy situation the threshold has been properly
raised, to Eth2 > Eth1 , in order to keep rb2 = 0.02 events/day. Let us assume this result was
obtained by doubling the threshold, i.e. Eth2/Eth1 = 2. On the other hand, the number
of coincidences due to g.w. bursts changes, as a certain fraction of the bursts will go
below threshold. To get the order of magnitude of the effect, let us take the number of
sources within the sensitivity volume increase as d3, where d is the maximum Earth-source
distance reachable at the chosen threshold. Instead, the energy of g.w.’s released in the
antenna goes like d−2. Thus, the rate of observable bursts is the ratio of the two energy
thresholds at the −3/2 power. Then, during T2 we get nc2 ≈ 20 + 18× 2−3/2 ≈ 26.
The upper plot of Fig. 10 shows the situation: the dotted curve is the R1, the
black dashed curve is the R2 (its peak value is ≃ 1.1 ). The peak of R1 and the peak of
R2 occur at different abscissae (rm1 = 1.8 · 10−2 bursts/day, rm2 = 0.6 · 10−2 bursts/day),
as expected due to the difference in the thresholds. Since the two periods refer to different
measurands, the product R1 · R2 has no inferential meaning. Let us plot it, just to see
what one would obtain by making improper use of the combination rule given by Eq.
(21). Let us imagine also, for comparison, the full period analysed as a single coincidence
experiment. The corresponding R function is indicated by RAV and is obtained using a
total number of simulated coincidences nc ≈ 40 + 18 + 6 = 64. Figure 10 shows that
R1 · R2 and RAV coincide, but this does not justify the use of RAV , as we know that
R1 · R2 is wrong too. It is important to note that the position of the peak has moved
27) These very long subperiods are chosen to give a sufficient number of coincidences when we consider
only two data samples. Obviously, the same considerations hold if the subperiods have lengths of
hours, as is more reasonable.
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Figure 10: Effect of na¨ıve combination of data taken at different effective thresholds. In both
plots the dotted curve is the R function of the data taken in the low-noise period (T1). The
black dashed curve is the R function of the data taken in the more noisy period (T2) such that
the threshold had to be varied by a factor of 2 (upper plot) or 5 (lower plot). The continuous
and the grey dashed lines (overlapping) represent R1 · R2 and RAV (see text).
to a value strongly influenced by the data taken in the less sensitive period. The peak
value is also reduced. Both these effects are a consequence of the mixing of different
physics quantities. This effect can be shown more clearly by a new simulation in which
the effective threshold during T2 is raised by a factor of 5 (bottom plot of Fig. 10). While
the first period contains quite strong evidence in favour of g.w. bursts of energy E > Eth1
and the second period provides a strong constraint for bursts of the higher energy Eth2 ,
the incorrect combinations mix up the two pieces of information, effectively spoiling both
individual results.
10.5.2 Combination of data having the same effective threshold
The results on the burst rate, with g.w.’s having a minimum energy Eth1 , can only
be obtained using the data collected during T1. In contrast, information about g.w. bursts
exceeding Eth2 can be obtained from both periods. The proper combination of the two
pieces of information is achieved by selecting the subsample of events taken during T1
which have E > Eth2 . The rate of background events exceeding Eth2 can be evaluated
by taking an exponential law relating threshold and rate, obtained assuming a Gaussian
noise for the amplitude [50]. We then obtain r′b1 = rb1 e
−Eth2/Eth1 ≈ 2.7 ·10−3. The number
of observed events in our simplified simulation is therefore n′c1 = 2.7 + 18× 2−3/2 ≈ 9.
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Figure 11: Combination of data sets using the same effective energy threshold. The dotted
curves are the R functions of the data taken in low noise period (T1), selected to have an
effective threshold equal to the data taken in the more noisy period (T2). The ratio of the
selection threshold to the data taking threshold is a factor 2 (upper plot) and a factor 5 (lower
plot). The continuous lines represent R1&2 = R1 · R2, i.e. the correct combination of the two
datasets. The grey dashed lines represent, instead, the result obtained by a na¨ıve average of the
two data sets.
The R functions relative to E > Eth2 for the two periods are plotted in the upper
plot of Fig. 11: The dotted curve is R1 and the black dashed curve is R2. The peaks
of R1 and R2 are now both at rm = 0.6 · 10−2 bursts/day, as the data refer to the
same effective energy threshold. The combined result is obtained by multiplying the two
partial results (i.e. R1&2 = R1 · R2) and is shown by the continuous line in Fig. 11. The
evidence achieved by the combination of the two results is much better than was obtained
in the good (i.e. low-noise) period alone. This is a general result obtained in a natural
way in the approach presented, and is in qualitative agreement with intuition. In fact, it
is reasonable to think that, if data are analysed correctly, even a very noisy period, in
which the detector is practically blind, should not spoil the evidence provided by the good
period. The overall evidence should increase as long as new data sets each containing a
bit of information are added to the analysis. The formalization of these considerations
comes from the observation that R has a constant value of 1 for rb → ∞ [see footnote
immediately after Eq. (19)].
The R function obtained by averaging the two periods, and indicated again by
RAV , is now obtained using rbAV = 1.13 · 10−2 events/day and nc = 35 coincidences. The
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corresponding RAV function is shown, for comparison, by the grey dashed line in Fig. 11.
This way of combining the data is unjustified, as it is not derived from general rules of
inference. Besides general arguments, the figure shows that the na¨ıve combination is less
efficient at using at best the evidence provided by the two sets of data. As before, a new
simulation in which the expected background rate during T2 is five times that during T1,
can illustrate more clearly this result. In fact, in the bottom plot of Fig. 11, one can now
see that the noisy period provides only a very small piece of evidence; nevertheless, the
correct combination of the two periods takes advantage even of this very tiny piece of
evidence, and the combined R1&2 has a peak slightly higher than R1. One can see that
the na¨ıve combination of the two periods, on the other hand, spoils the result obtained by
the first period alone. This is obviously absurd: It is true that an infinitely noisy period
brings no new information to the physical quantity of interest, but neither should it spoil
the result achieved in the good period.
11 Conclusions
The problem of reporting the result about the intensity of a Poisson process at
the limit of the detector sensitivity and in the presence of background has been analysed
from the perspective of probabilistic inference. This approach assumes that probability is
related to the status of uncertainty and its value classifies the plausibility of hypotheses
in the light of all available knowledge. We consider this approach the most general one to
draw probabilistic conclusions in conditions of uncertainty, which is always the case when
we want to infer the value of a physics quantity from experimental observations.
This approach is also known as Bayesian statistics because of the key role played
by Bayes’ theorem in updating probability in the light of new data. We have given argu-
ments to show that Bayes’ theorem is quite natural and produces results in qualitative
agreement with intuition. That probabilistic conclusions depend also on priors is natural
too, although their presence tends to produce uneasiness in the practitioners. This kind
of ‘priors anxiety’ can be overcome if one understands their meaning and their role, which
we have illustrated here with examples.
We have shown that the contribution of the priors becomes irrelevant in routine
cases, i.e. when the response of the detector is very narrow around the true value. However,
in frontier-science measurements, priors become crucial; so crucial that it is preferable to
refrain from providing probabilistic results. In this situation, the most objective way of
reporting the result is to give directly likelihoods, or rescaled likelihoods in the form of
relative belief updating ratios (R functions), described in this paper. The advantage of
reporting R functions is that they are easily perceived and the combination of several
experimental results can be achieved in the most efficient way.
From the perspective illustrated in this paper, we consider a false problem that
of finding a unique and objective prescription to calculate upper/lower limits (or contour
curves, in the case of two-dimensional problems), which would summarize efficiently the
result of the experiment and would allow a consistent combination of results. Nowadays
it is easy to provide the complete R function, or several R functions, depending on
assumptions with regard to systematic effects. Nevertheless, we understand that it can
be practical to summarize the results with a number which roughly separates the region
in which the experiment loses sensitivity (and R goes to 1) from the region practically
ruled out by the data (R → 0). This number can be based on a conventional value of
the R function in the region of transition between 1 and 0. We have shown that similar
numbers for the bounds can be obtained using a standard Bayesian inference which uses
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a uniform prior. The upper/lower bounds calculated in this latter way can be interpreted
as the probabilistic limits that would be evaluated by the researchers sharing a positive
attitude toward the possibility of the planned search.
The ideas illustrated in this paper have already been applied to combine all pieces
of evidence able to constrain the Higgs boson mass [48] and to the analysis of deep-
inelastic scattering events to search for new contact-type interactions between electrons
and quarks [46, 47]. We have shown here that they are very useful in the analysis of grav-
itational wave bursts in coincidence experiments. Indeed, the publication of the results in
terms of R functions for signals above a well-defined effective threshold (within unavoid-
able uncertainty) represents an efficient way of taking advantage of all possible pieces of
evidence hidden in the data.
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Note added
We would like to bring the attention of the reader to an interesting report [57]
which appeared while the present paper was going through the final editing procedures.
Although much of the effort of the author has been dedicated to “deduce correct confidence
limits”, the report of Eitel shows for the first time (log-)likelihood functions of neutrino
oscillation experiments as 3-D plots (Figs. 2, 5 and 13). Since offsets in log-likelihoods
are equivalent to factors in likelihoods, these results can be easily reinterpreted with
the language developed in our paper: The asymptotic insensitivity region corresponds
to level 100 of Fig. 2 and level 0 of Fig. 13 (unfortunately, level ≈ 84 is out of scale
in Fig. 5). Moreover, the similarity between the curves of Fig. 14 of Ref. [57] and the
R functions of our paper is self-evident. Indeed, these curves transmit the experimental
result immediately and intuitively. Comparing Figs. 13 and 6 (and then extrapolating
to Fig. 5, where the ‘flat ridge’ is missing), one can realize how misleading the standard
way of presenting neutrino oscillation results as spots in the {sin2 2θ, ∆m2} plane can be.
Figure 6 gives the impression that LSND rules out all parameter space outside the spots.
However, Fig. 14 shows that LSND only rules out the parameter region which is also
excluded by KARMEN. Most of the complementary region is the region of insensitivity.
In the boundary between these two regions (where KARMEN has already lost sensitivity),
there is certainly a spot where there is very high evidence (we assume no systematic effects
have been overlooked), but this evidence cannot lead us to necessarely believe that the
true values of sin2 2θ and ∆m2 are there, unless we have other reasons to believe it.
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